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The state-centric theory of forced migration presents the nation-state as the ultimate 
sanctuary of citizen rights. It posits that forced migration results from state instability, 
which is caused by geopolitical or national identity conflict. In either case, it contends 
that the sources of forced migration are exogenous to the state. This paper argues that 
under certain conditions the state becomes an endogenous cause of refugees and 
internally displaced persons. These conditions occur when the state deploys violence 
to dominate society. Using the case of Afghanistan, we document that since 1973 a 
series of Socialist, Islamist, and Capitalist regimes have engaged in violent development: 
coercive material modernization and social modernity which led to societal resistance 
followed by state repression and forced migration. This recurring pattern calls into 
question the state as protector of citizens and instead suggests that the state causes 
forced migration under conditions of state-society incompatibility.  
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 The prevailing theory of forced migration assumes that               
refugees and displaced persons are an episodic aberration in an                   
otherwise functional nation-state system. In this state-centric model, 
the state is portrayed as the guarantor of security through the                      
institution of citizenship (Betts and Loescher 2011; Owens 2011). To 
explain forced migration, the theory identifies an exogenous cause that 
disrupts the ability of the state to protect its citizens. From the 1950s 
through the 1980s, this cause was thought to be decolonization and 
super-power proxy wars (Gordenker 1987; Loescher 1989; Zolberg, 
Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). Explanations of forced migration then 
shifted from international geo-political conflict between states to          
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internal societal conflict that led to state failure (Keely 1996; Toft 
2007). 
While not altogether dismissing the state's role as a guarantor 
of citizens' rights, we argue that under certain conditions the state  
itself produces refugees, internally displaced persons, and other                
victims of forced migration. Drawing on the state-society relations 
literature (Castells 2004; Focault 1995; Touraine 1971, 1977; Weber 
1964), we argue that forced migration can become endogenous to the 
state because the state as an organizational form was from the                     
beginning an institution that encoded domination and resistance into 
its most basic structure. Using the case of Afghanistan since 1973, we 
document one cause of state-society incompatibility which we term 
violent development. We define violent development as the state’s                  
coercive transformation of material conditions (modernization) and 
social institutions (modernity). These violent changes to society                    
produce forced migration. But they also produce popular resistance by 
non-state actors. The state then applies additional coercion and this 
repression leads to more forced migration. 
We select Afghanistan as a case for three reasons. First,                  
Afghanistan is the single-largest source of refugees since World War II 
and accounts for about one in four of all refugees on earth. Second, 
forced migration in Afghanistan is frequently attributed to causes             
exogenous to the Afghan state, such as geopolitical conflict or ethnic 
rivalry. Third, since 1973 a series of different regimes--Socialist,               
Islamist, and Capitalist--have attempted to create various states in  
Afghanistan. All efforts resorted to repression as they failed,                     
producing millions of Afghan refugees and displaced persons. By    
documenting a reoccurring pattern of violent development in                 
Afghanistan, we demonstrate that state-society incompatibility is a 
cause of forced migration overlooked by the state-centric theory 
which focuses on the state as a guarantor of citizen rights.  
 
THE STATE-CENTRIC THEORY OF FORCED MIGRATION 
 The UN's first Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
only applied to refugees in Europe who fled events occurring before 
January 1, 1951 (UNHCR 2000). It assumed that forced migration 
would become rare in the new and more stable nation-state system. 
The 1951 Convention thus defined a refugee as a person who "owing 
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to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political                 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country" (UNHCR 2000:23).  
This definition's emphasis on state persecution and national 
borders appeared self-evident given the forced migrations in Europe 
during World Wars I and II (Marrus 1985). But in 1964, the number 
of refugees in Africa and Asia surpassed those in Europe. In 1967, the 
UN's Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees removed the                 
geographic and time limitations from the 1951 definition (UNHCR 
2000). By 1990, the number of refugees had fallen below the number 
of internally displaced persons (IDPs): people forced from their 
homes--but who do not cross an international border--due to local 
violence that is ignored, condoned, or even fomented by their state 
(IDMC 2008). Eight years later, the UN adopted the Guiding                  
Principles on International Displacement (Cohen and Deng 1998). By 
2009, the global ratio had surged to 26 million IDPs and 16 million 
refugees, while some 9 million people were not considered nationals 
by any country and thus "stateless" (UNHCR 2009a). 
The close connection between refugees and the state was 
identified in the early 1990s (Hein 1993) and it remains central to              
social science and public policy thinking about forced migration.              
According to the UNHCR (2000:276) : "The current structure of              
refugee protection was designed in and for a state-centric system." 
This model draws heavily on political science classics such as                      
Aristotle, Hobbes, and Arendt to argue that states benefit society 
through the institution of citizenship (Owens 2011). As summarized 
by Betts and Loescher (2011:6):  
 
 The normative basis of the state system is the idea 
that all people have a state that is  responsible for 
ensuring their most basic rights and protection. 
The most salient characteristic which connects 
different categories of the vernacular "refugee" is 
not geographical movement per se [emphasis in 
original] but rather the inability or unwillingness of 
the country of origin to ensure citizen's protection. 
3
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According to this state-centric theory of refugee production, 
an event beyond the state's control prevents it from carrying out its 
function to protect citizens. Decolonization and the Cold War were 
once cited as the primary causes of state instability and thus forced 
migration (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguauo 1989). With the end of the 
Cold War explanations shifted to various forms of societal conflict 
that lead to fragile, failing or failed states (Toft 2007). The first book-
length analysis of IDPs (Cohen and Deng 1998) argued that "wars 
within states often reflect a crisis of national identity in a society" (6) 
and thus "most conflicts that lead to mass displacement have a strong 
ethnic component" (22). The UNHCR (2000:275) agreed, stating that 
with the end of the Cold War "the ideological motivation for conflict 
diminished. Often, it was replaced by identity-based conflicts built 
around religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, language or region."  
Based on this review of policy and social science models of 
refugees, we draw two conclusions about the state-centric theory of 
forced migration that are very similar to those of Haddad (2008): 
 
1) The state is a defining feature of forced migration since a  refugee 
has to have a state to flee from to have refugee status; 
2) The state is also seen as the guarantor of citizens' rights. 
 
We draw two additional conclusions that are not found in Haddad's 
(2008) "between sovereigns" thesis since she focuses on how refugees 
are constructed as "others" to reinforce state sovereignty. The state-
centric theory of forced migration implies:  
 
3) The nation-state system is a mechanism that can prevent or at 
least limit refugee production; 
4) Post-World War II refugee production is due to geopolitical 
events or identity conflicts that are exogenous to the state.  
 
While recognizing that the state does play an important role in                   
protecting citizens, we argue that the state itself becomes a source of 
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STATE-SOCIETY COMPATIBILITY IN THE NATION-STATE 
SYSTEM 
 The modern nation-state system was first formulated in                
Europe by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) to end the Thirty Years 
War. The watershed year of 1648 culminated many trends favoring the 
view that the rights of citizens derive from the sovereignty of the                 
territorial state, which offers citizens protections and liberties. Perhaps 
the greatest development was the Enlightenment's notions of                        
individual freedoms from oppressive feudal authority (Israel 2011). 
The Enlightenment produced a political model which held that                  
human rights are inalienable rather than based on wealth and power, 
such as in a plutocracy, oligarchy, feudal lords, and emperors. Since 
these elites came from society, the growth of the state as the guarantor 
of rights implied that the more the state was autonomous from society 
the more rights it could provide for all people now conceptualized as 
a nation or "country" (Somers 2008). 
Given that more than nine-tenths of human history passed 
before the state evolved, a system which posits that states are                        
autonomous from society and should have primacy over society will 
lead to a tension in state-society relations. The tension between state 
and society is managed by what Weber (1964) calls the state monopoly 
of violence whereby non-state actors are prevented from using                  
coercion thus protecting citizens. In the Weberian state, the                       
deployment of such violence is legitimate simply because it is                     
sanctioned by the state. Its legitimacy is in fact consecrated when the 
state's authority is challenged by non-state violence, which is deemed a 
threat to what the state calls "law and order."  
By virtue of the state's monopoly over violence, states                
attempt to centralize ever more power which produces resistance 
from non-state actors (Touraine 1971, 1977). In political-sociological 
terms, the state's centralization of power triggers societies’ default 
mode of decentralization and thus a contradiction in state-society      
relations. Often this struggle takes the form of social movements that 
push back the “disciplinarian state’s” (Focault 1995) occupation of the 
Habermasian lifeworld (Castells 2004) or what Bourdieu (1990) calls 
objective “field” and even his subjective habitus.  
We use the above insights about the incompatibility of state-
society relations to identify the set of conditions under which the state 
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becomes an endogenous cause of forced migration. We term these                
conditions violent development by which we mean the state’s coercive 
transformation of material conditions (modernization) and/or social 
institutions (modernity). This coercive social change causes forced 
migration but it also yields popular resistance by non-state actors. The 
state then applies additional force and this repression leads to more 
forced migration.  
 
IS THE STATE THE SOLUTION OR CAUSE OF THE 
WORLD’S BIGGEST REFUGEE CRISIS? 
 In one of the first overviews of the Afghan refugee crisis, 
Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont (1988:71) remarked: "The case of 
the Afghan refugees is unique in the twentieth century: they make up 
the greatest population of the same origin ever transplanted outside of 
their own borders." The same could still be said twenty years later. 
Estimates of the proportion of all living Afghans who have been                 
refugees at one point in their lives range from one-third to 64 percent 
and possibly even two-thirds, but even using the lowest figure "more 
Afghans have lived as refugees than any other population in the 
world’s recent history" (Kronenfeld 2008: 57).  
A comparison with other refugee crises helps us appreciate 
the magnitude of forced migration in Afghanistan. In no year since 
1981 has any refugee group outnumbered Afghans (UNHCR 2000). 
During the peak of the Mozambique refugee crisis in 1992 (1.3                 
million) there were 4.6 million Afghan refugees. At the height of the 
Rwanda refugee crisis in 1994 (2.3 million) there were 2.7 million              
Afghan refugees. When the Bosnian refugee crisis erupted in 1996 
(893,000) there were 2.7 million Afghan refugees. Although more than 
4 million Afghans returned to their homeland from 2001 to 2005, 
some 3.5 million remained abroad, suggesting that the Afghan refugee                    
population numbered almost 8 million at its peak (Kronenfeld 2008). 
Other sources estimate the peak number to be 8.3 million (Margesson 
2007). In 2009, Iraq became a leading source of refugees (1.9 million). 
But there were still 2.8 million Afghan refugees (UNHCR 2009b).  
A wide range of causes have been invoked to explain the  
Afghan refugee crises (see table 1). Some focus on the cultural                   
characteristics of Afghan society which have historically promoted 
migration and a disregard for states and international borders. Others 
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emphasize geo-political conflict in which violence inside Afghanistan 
serves the interests of neighboring states and superpowers. Still others 
argue that state failure is the underlying cause since without a strong 
national government there is no check on local warlords.  
 In the wake of 9/11, the state failure argument gained many 
adherents (Rotberg 2002; Fukuyama 2004). They unambiguously                
stated that Afghanistan needed a strong central state to                         
counterbalance the chaos in society. Cramer and Goodhand 
(2002:885) argued that "neither peace nor economic development will 
hold without a centralized, credible and effective state, that the                   
emergence of such a state is a political problem more than a technical 
problem, and that it will depend on a monopolization of force by the 
7
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state." According to Suhrke, Harpviken, and Strand (2002: 875): 
"Rebuilding the coercive capacity of the state is essential to overcome 
strong centrifugal tendencies." Wimmer and Schetter (2003:525) 
agreed and stated: "The programme of reconstruction should have a 
clear strategic focus and be designed as a state-building project. The 
main problem Afghanistan faces is the absence of a monopoly of 
power and of other basic state functions." Afghanistan was deemed so 
deficient that it required a completely new nation-state: 
 
It is worth distinguishing state building—the                
creation of the institutional capacity to govern—
from nation building, which involves bringing    
together disparate and antagonistic social groups 
in a common government. But in cases like                 
Somalia and Afghanistan, both are necessary, and 
the two probably have to be attempted at the 
same time (Engelhart 2003:19). 
 
Evaluations of US nation-state building in Afghanistan                   
suggest they have failed (Nurussaman 2009; Rashid 2008). But we also 
draw a larger lesson: they failed because they pursued a policy of              
violent development quite similar to that of previous regimes. In the                       
remainder of this paper, we account for the Afghan refugee crises 
since 1973 by documenting a recurring pattern of incompatibility in 
state-society relations. We periodize our argument using five phases of 
violent development. For each period we identify the state actor, state 
name, state goal, and primary societal groups that were targets of               
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VIOLENT DEVELOPMENT I: THE PDPA AND MARXISM-
LENINISM 
 The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 
founded by Noor Muhammad Taraki in 1965, was a political                       
progenitor of the anti-monarchist movement in Afghanistan (Tarzi 
2008). It supported Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan, then Prime 
Minister of Afghanistan. Although a cousin of the Afghan King                
Mohammed Zahir Shah, Daud was a republican in his political                
outlook. In a clandestine pact with the PDPA, he deposed the                  
monarch when the latter was on a visit to Italy, declared Afghanistan a 
republic, and became its first president.   
9
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Daud was fully backed by the PDPA in all of his moves from the 
monarch’s deposing to the declaration of Afghanistan as a republic. 
The PDPA immediately unrolled its own agenda to build a 
democratic Afghanistan out of the ashes of its monarchical past. It 
violently purged major government institutions, including the military 
and civil service. It then attempted to replace religion with Marxist-
Leninist ideology as a prelude to economic modernization.  
But the PDPA was an urban social movement and had lost 
touch with the reality of Afghan society (Ewans 2002). Rural Afghans 
resisted modernization and modernity, but not for ideological reasons. 
For centuries they had organized themselves into economically and 
socially self-sufficient extended families, clans and tribes independent 
of a nation-state. In a giant leap of time, they were now thrown under 
the growing weight of an ever-expanding republic that violently                
pursued control over their private and public lives. Impatient with the 
slow pace of republican modernity under the Daoud government, the 
PDPA staged a coup in April 1978 to speed up the process of                 
modernization and modernity. President Daoud, together with 22 of 
his family members, was assassinated and dumped in an unmarked 
mass grave. The PDPA fielded its founding leader Noor Mohammad 
Taraki to become President. He installed two of his comrades,                  
Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal, as his deputies.  
Soon after assuming the Presidency, Taraki signed a Treaty of 
Friendship with the Soviet Union and then launched radical reforms 
that encompassed not only the urban centers of Afghanistan but its 
remote rural districts as well, where they met with resounding                    
rejection (Rubin 2002). Undaunted, Taraki continued with his                     
modernity agenda and renamed the “Republic of Afghanistan” the 
“Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.” The Taraki government came 
down hard on the rural population for their putative backward               
religious beliefs. Its chief targets were the clergy and tribal chiefs, for 
whom Taraki had unreserved contempt.  
The PDPA, however, could not stay united because Afghan 
society was split along ethnic lines (Tarzi 2008). The Pashtun faction 
called itself the PDPA-Khalq (Pashtu for masses) and non-Pashtun 
took the name PDPA-Parcham (Persian for flag). Then a further split 
developed in the PDPA-Khalq, dividing it into the Red Khalq 
(adherents of Taraki) and the Black Khalq (followers of Hafizullah 
10
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Amin, Taraki’s deputy). Eventually, this divide took Taraki’s life as 
well as that of Amin. By late 1979, the Soviets no longer trusted their 
proxies and sent the first contingent of 20,000 troops to Kabul to take 
direct control, eventually increasing the number to 120,000 (Ewans 
2002).    
  
VIOLENT DEVELOPMENT II: THE USSR AND SOCIALIST 
MODERNIZATION AND MODERNITY 
 The Soviets chose Babrak Karmal as their puppet and put 
him in the Presidential Palace. For the Soviets, Afghanistan itself 
meant little. They wanted to use Afghanistan as a stepping stone into 
neighboring Balochistan, Pakistan’s coastal province on the Arabian 
Sea (Harrison 1981; Rais 1986; Hopkirk 1992). Landlocked Soviet 
Republics needed access to the year-round warm waters of the                     
Arabian Sea and by extension the Indian Ocean. The Soviets’ ultimate 
goal was to establish an unrivaled maritime presence over the Persian 
Gulf, including the key shipping lane at the Strait of Hurmoz and the 
Strait of Malacca (Niazi 2008). At the time, the only Western naval 
presence on the Indian Ocean was a British base in Diego Garcia, to 
which the U.S. had access as well.  
To achieve this goal, the Soviets first needed to put down the 
growing Afghan resistance movement. They attempted to counter the 
movement with modernization, portraying the farmers, herders, and 
religious authorities who resisted them as economically unproductive 
and primitive (Kakar 1995; Rubin 2002). In contrast, they presented 
socialist development as a means to usher medieval Afghanistan into 
the 20th Century. The benefits of socialist development were assumed 
to be a modern economy and society on par with Iran and Pakistan. 
Unlike the Taraki regime, the Soviets argued that economic                        
modernization should precede modernity (the social transformation of 
Afghanistan). They initiated major projects in the country’s                         
agricultural, industrial and mineral sectors of the economy. In                       
addition, gigantic modernization projects included the fabled Salang 
Pass, irrigation in the Helmand Valley, road networks, and new                    
telecommunication infrastructure. As part of modernity, Marx and 
Marxism came to dominate the curricula in educational institutions, 
pushing traditional religious instruction into the background.  
11
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Both modernization and modernity, however, threatened                    
Afghans’ traditional culture, subsistence economy, hundreds of years 
of history and customary practices, and were fiercely resisted. In 1989, 
the Soviets retreated in humiliation, leaving the country in the hands 
of Afghan physician Dr. Najibullah Khan. In 1992, the Khan                        
government fell as his top military commanders began to defect to the 
anti-Soviet "freedom-fighters" who were waiting in the wings to form 
an Islamic government.  
  
VIOLENT DEVELOPMENT III: THE JAMIAT-HIZB AND             
ISLAMIC COMMUNITY 
 While militarily effective, the freedom fighters were hardly 
unified. Their two major religious parties mirrored traditional Afghan 
social divisions (Shahrani 2008). The Jamiat-e-Islami, led by 
Burhanuddin Rabbani, was dominated by ethnic Tajiks. The Hizb-e-
Islami, led by Gulbadin Hekmatyar, was dominated by ethnic                   
Pashtuns.  
To minimize conflict, Pakistan brokered a peace deal between 
the Jamiat and Hizb for power-sharing in the post-Soviet Afghanistan 
(Rashid 2000). Although Pakistan had long favored the Pashtun-
dominated Hizb over the Tajik-dominated Jamiat, the deal it brokered 
gave the Jamiat the upper hand in the interim. Under the deal, both 
parties were to share power until the mutually agreed elections were 
held within one year to choose a permanent government. In the                 
interim, Rabbani became President and Hekmatyar Prime Minister.  
Despite their differences, Rabbani and Hekmatyar agreed on 
one thing: they should rename the country the “Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan.” As Islamic modernists, they also agreed to reverse the 
Soviets' development model in which modernization preceded                   
modernity (social transformation). Instead, they gave primacy to                
culture over the economy (Kakar 1995). This sequential reversal in the 
development agenda reflected the lack of expertise and material means 
to initiate modernization (i.e., material transformation of society in its 
economy and economic infrastructure). On the other hand, they were 
quite conversant with low-cost or no-cost cultural transformation.  
For the Jamiat-Hizb alliance, Islamic modernity meant state 
control over human behavior to cultivate "virtue" and eliminate "vice" 
with violent enforcement when necessary. They first purged what they 
12
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called "communists" in Afghan institutions. This witch-hunt triggered 
the forced migration of hundreds of thousands of middle and upper-
middle class Afghans to neighboring countries, Europe, and North 
America (Shahrani 2008). But the major casualty was the Afghan                
feminist movement (one of the rare bright legacies of the Soviets) 
which was completely ousted from the country (Azarbaijani-
Moghaddam 2004). Some feminists took refuge in Pakistan, and their 
resilient survival is a remarkable event of Afghan history that deserves 
a full accounting of its own. 
These violent purges were followed by institutional change. 
Schools and curricula were returned to Islamic tenets and the limited 
media technology amplified a nation-building message using the               
concept of “Umma” (Ewans 2002). Best translated as "Islamic                  
community," Umma as a doctrine attempts to transcend social                   
variation, such as national identity, among Muslims and build in its 
place a universal solidarity around a common faith.  
Afghans did not object to the idea of Umma, as Islamic               
communitarianism fit well with traditional Afghan society in which 
individual interests were subordinate to communal interests. But they 
did resist the building of an Islamic nation-state, which they found 
divisive and exclusionary within the Afghan social context. For                
instance, Hazaras, who subscribe to the Shiite faith and number               
approximately 1.5 million of the Afghan population, felt excluded 
from the Sunni-dominated Islamic modernity project (Shahrani 2008). 
This exclusion led to resistance in central Afghanistan.  
There were also ethnic splits among Sunnis. Pashtuns, as the 
founders of Afghanistan, considered it their birthright to rule the 
country (Rashid 2000). They could not imagine, let alone accept, a 
non-Pashtun (Tajik) President served by a Pashtun Prime                   
Minister. In the mid-1990s, this simmering conflict erupted into 
a civil war that killed 20,000 Afghans (Shahrani 2008).                       
Eventually, the Rabbani government fell in 1996. A far more 
hard-line group of Islamists took its place. They were the first 
generation of Afghan refugees who had fled the Taraki and                  
Soviet regimes. Religiously trained in seminaries in Pakistan, 
they were known as the Taliban (students).  
  
13
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VIOLENT DEVELOPMENT IV: THE TALIBAN AND             
ISLAMIC ORTHODOXY 
 The Taliban entered Afghanistan in 1996 and based 
themselves in Kandahar, the traditional center of Pashtun power 
and the birth place of Mullah Omer, the movement's founding 
leader (Rashid 2000). They then advanced on Kabul, which was 
already deserted by the crumbling Jamiat-Hizb coalition                    
government. After entering Kabul, the Taliban captured Dr. 
Najibullah Khan, the last Afghan "Communist" ruler. Khan was 
publically tortured to death and his mutilated body hung from a 
tower in the main square of the city for three days before he was 
allowed a Muslim burial.  
Like the Jamiat-Hizb coalition of Islamists, the Taliban 
had nothing to offer Afghans that would improve their material 
standard of living. They rather opted for ideological state               
centralization via religious orthodoxy (Rashid 2000). They set 
out on their “transformative agenda” by tinkering with the 
country’s name – the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. To them 
a republic was a transgression against Islam. Borrowing its               
nomenclature from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), one of 
their sponsors, they named the country the “Islamic Emirates of 
Afghanistan.” But the Taliban took more than nomenclature 
from the UAE. They also incorporated and internalized its                       
religious conservatism. Combined with their literalist                       
interpretation of Islam, the Taliban set out to create a                       
disciplinarian state that quickly triggered another wave of forced 
migration, especially from northern, eastern, and central                   
Afghanistan (Shahrani 2008).  
Under the Taliban, Afghanistan degenerated into a                     
virtual prison, especially for women (Rashid 2000). The Taliban 
banned women from working outside their homes, although, in 
an ironic twist, they allowed them to beg in public. To enforce 
these and other regulations, the Taliban state created an army of 
young Virtucrats. These zealots used TV antennas to beat      
women who dared step out of their homes unescorted. The  
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Taliban state also outlawed male sports, such as cricket and 
football, and replaced them with violent public entertainment 
orchestrated by the Virtucrats. Each Friday, “adulterers” and 
“adulteresses” were brought to the Sports Stadium in the heart 
of Kabul and stoned to death by the watching crowd.  
Not content to hold sway in Kandahar and Kabul, the 
Taliban pushed into northern Afghanistan, where leaders of the 
Jamiat-e-Islami and its supporters had retreated and established 
their internationally recognized capital in Mazar-i-Sharif (Rashid 
2000). The Taliban mounted several offensives against the city, 
but were repulsed. Finally, in 1998, they captured Mazar-i-Sharif 
and massacred thousands of prisoners and civilians. Among the 
many consequences of the Taliban's almost total control of                   
Afghanistan was increased international recognition by other 
Islamic social movements. One of them was al-Qaeda founded 
by Osama Ben Laden, whom the Taliban welcomed after his 
expulsion from Sudan. Ben Laden turned Afghanistan into a 
training ground for al-Qaeda, his global terrorist network. After 
the 9/11 attacks, the US demanded that the Taliban turn Bin 
Laden over. They refused. In September-October, 2001, the US 
launched an air blitzkrieg and within weeks dislodged the                    
Taliban.  
  
VIOLENT DEVELOPMENT V: US-NATO AND                      
CAPITALIST MODERNITY AND MODERNIZATION 
 Before the first US soldier set foot in Afghanistan, the 
Taliban, Bin Laden, and al-Qaeda had already fled. Since then, 
US and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) troops 
have sought to keep them from returning by creating a new             
Afghan state (Jones 2006).  
The early US victory was only made possible through a 
partnership with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance (NA), of 
which the Jamiat-e-Islami was the dominant force (Chayes 
2007). Not surprisingly, US forces were beholden to the NA for 
its military support against the Taliban. But the US-NA                
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partnership did not sit well with nationalist Pashtuns because 
the NA is dominated by ethnic Tajiks. The NA's hostility                 
towards the Taliban is shared by many Pashtuns, but Pashtuns 
regarded the NA as an anti-Pashtun force. It is noteworthy that 
most of the Taliban are Pashtuns, but all Pashtuns do not have 
allegiance to the Taliban. Nonetheless, Pashtuns continue to be 
suspect in the eyes of US and NATO forces, as well as non-
Pashtun Afghans.  
These social contradictions presented insurmountable 
challenges to the US-NATO effort at nation building and state 
centralization (Tarzi 2008). The US and NATO have diligently 
worked to build the Afghan military, paramilitary, police, and 
civil service. Yet the institutions they have created are marred by 
ethnic imbalances. For example, the ethnic Tajik minority is        
disproportionately overrepresented in the Afghan National                
Army and Afghan Police, while the ethnic Pashtun plurality is 
disproportionately underrepresented in these institutions. The 
significance of these social contradictions does not register with 
western observers who assume state institutions operate by                 
bureaucracy, not ethnicity.  
Yet Afghan society requires members of clans and tribes 
to share resources with kith and kin regardless of national law. 
What is nepotism to the state is custom to the ethnic group, in 
this case, the Tajiks. Pashtuns, who constitute 45 percent of the 
national population, can hardly be expected to support national 
institutions which benefit rival ethnic groups. Pashtuns' real or 
perceived exclusion from state institutions does not augur well 
for peace-building because it is inhibiting the return of millions 
of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran. The expansion of the 
US-NATO mandate into nation- and state-building has ignored 
what Kagan (2012) now describes as a primer for U.S. foreign 
engagements: history. First, US-NATO forces assumed the                
existence of an Afghan national identity which transcends                 
ethnic, religious, and regional divisions. Second, they                     
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consistently ignored the group interests of clans and tribes in 
favor of individual interests.  
The most glaring example of failed nation-state building 
by US-NATO is the introduction of national elections. For                    
centuries, Afghans have had a robust local democratic forum of 
Loya Jirga (the grand assembly of elders) in which each tribe and 
faith has due representation (Rubin 2002). This Jirga serves as 
the electoral college, as well as the highest forum of consultation 
on matters of national importance (Niazi 2007). One-person-
one-vote runs counter to this centuries-old institution. Yet as                    
evidenced by the 2009 presidential election, it was only with the 
blessing of the Jirga that President Karzai won a second term in 
office. Although the US and NATO alleged that the election 
was fraudulent, it merely reflected the profound influence of the 
Afghan social system that was being challenged by a transplant 
of the state system unknown to Afghan society.  
All of the US-NATO’s efforts at nation-building were 
accompanied by massive spending on Afghanistan’s economic 
modernization. Just the U.S. alone spent $38 billion in 2001-
2009 on the country’s infrastructure-building that included, 
among others, the development of agriculture, water reservoirs, 
roads, schools and private sector businesses (Tarnoff 2009). To 
put this number in perspective, the $38 billion in economic aid 
is almost 270 percent of Afghanistan’s annual GDP of $15               
billion. Prominent among key U.S. agencies that execute                 
modernization efforts are the Department of Defense, Agency 
for International Development, the Department of State and the 
Department of Agriculture. These efforts, however, are resisted 
with insurgent violence in which members of construction 
crews are routinely kidnapped or killed, and schools are regularly 
bombed, not to mention that NATO forces come under                    
insurgent attacks on a daily basis. This top-down development is 
meeting bottom-up violence. The result is collateral damage in 
fatalities and forced migration, when security forces raid villages 
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to hunt insurgents or insurgents attack villagers for aiding                 
security forces. 
The futility of this experimentation has caused a change 
of heart even among those who were once ardent advocates for 
such efforts. A case in point is Robert Kagan, who fervently 
supported U.S. efforts at nation-building in Afghanistan as well 
as Iraq. In his latest book, he cautioned the United States against 
engaging in any such effort without due regard to the history of 
the place (Kagan 2012). The Obama administration seems to be 
listening. It has now moved away from building a Good                  
Afghanistan to a “Good Enough Afghanistan” (Sanger 2012). 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 The state-centric theory of forced migration was                   
codified by the UN in 1951 and it remains the dominant model 
for understanding refugees, displaced persons, and other people 
who flee political violence. According to this theory, the state 
protects citizens unless it is destabilized by some external force. 
The refugee and forced migration studies literature has                     
documented one exogenous cause after another: decolonization, 
the Cold War, the War on Terrorism, ethnic rivalry, national 
identity conflicts, and most recently "chaos" that leads to fragile, 
failing, or failed states. But there is a blind-spot in this approach 
because the theory privileges the state over society. Although 
the state will always play some role as a guarantor of protection 
for its citizens, we have argued that the state itself becomes an 
endogenous cause of forced migration under certain conditions. 
These conditions occur when the state creates incompatible 
state-society relations and then uses force to maintain them. 
To empirically document incompatible state-society              
relations, we analyzed coercive modernization and modernity in 
Afghanistan under three very different regimes. Whether the 
regime was Socialist, Islamist, or Capitalist, there was a similar 
pattern of violent development. Forced migration resulted             
because the state forced society to change in ways that violated 
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preexisting material practices and social institutions. But forced 
migration in Afghanistan continued because non-state actors 
resisted state domination. State repression of this resistance        
produced more refugees and displaced persons. The fact that 
such different regimes engaged in such similar behavior                      
supports our contention that the causes of forced migration can 
become endogenous to the state rather than the type of regime 
produced by exogenous factors.  
Additional evidence that forced migration can result 
from state-society incompatibility is the wide variation among 
the groups persecuted by the state as it engaged in and then               
reinforced violent development. In some phases of violent               
development in Afghanistan the state targeted rural and religious 
segments of civil society. In other phases the targets were the 
middle class and comparatively secular urban populations.                 
Several regimes targeted women and/or specific ethnic                      
populations and religious faiths. The fact that virtually every 
group in Afghan society has been subject to state persecution at 
some point since 1973 suggests that the underlying mechanism 
of forced migration in Afghanistan is state domination of                  
society. Inter-state conflicts and intra-society rivalries merely 
determine who wins the state and with it the power to enforce 
violent development. 
There are some historical features of Afghanistan which 
may limit the generalizability of our conclusions, such as the fact 
that the British wanted Afghanistan to serve as a buffer state 
rather than an ideal of the modern nation-state. Nonetheless, we 
justify our focus on Afghanistan in two ways. The first reason is                       
methodological and the second theoretical.  
The case study method which we have pursued is                 
particularly appropriate for research on forced migration. While 
refugees and internally displaced persons are a global                       
phenomenon, they are also highly concentrated. More than two-
thirds of all refugees originate from Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, 
Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNHCR 
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2009a). Three countries account for 45 percent of the world's 
internally displaced persons: Sudan, Columbia, and Iraq (IDMC 
2009). Thus rather than develop a universal theory that attempts 
to account for all forms of forced migration, it is                       
methodologically appropriate to identify a set of conditions that 
explain the largest and longest crises. Estimates of more than 8 
million Afghan refugees have led some observers to call the     
crisis the biggest since World War II or even the biggest of the 
twentieth century. In conventional social science terminology, it 
would indeed by quite an accomplishment if a causal                       
explanation (violent development) accounted for 25 percent of a 
dependent variable (the proportion of Afghan refugees among 
all refugees). 
Theory is the second and most important reason for     
focusing on Afghanistan. The prevailing explanation of forced 
migration emphasizes causes external to the state. This theory 
has been applied to Afghanistan since the 1980s. Numerous 
books and journal articles attribute Afghan refugees and                
displaced persons to state instability due to ethnic strife,                    
religious divisions, inter-state conflicts, and civil wars. The most 
recent line of reasoning argues that "chaos" has caused the state 
to fail. All of these arguments have some validity but they miss 
the larger pattern. Since 1973, a series of regimes have created 
an incompatibility between state and society by engaging in                   
violent development. Forced migration will continue in                       
Afghanistan, and the world, whenever the state dominates                 
society through the deployment of violence.  
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